CO 2 emission allowances are traded with increasing liquidity within the EU emissions trading scheme. Besides spot contracts, futures and options are also available OTC and on exchanges across Europe. The focus of this study is on the relationship between spot and futures markets in the EU ETS. An empirical examination reveals that after initial divergence spot prices equal discounted futures prices for futures maturing within the trial period. Moreover, we find that these futures contracts lead the price discovery process of CO 2 emission allowances. EUA futures can therefore be of crucial importance for all participants in the emission market through facilitating price discovery and offering means of hedging CO 2 -related risks. However, due to the market design, we are not able to learn much about fair second period futures prices from the current spot market.
Introduction
The EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) dominates the global carbon market with spot, futures, and option trades in market value of US$50 billion (€37 billion) in 2007.
Futures contracts account for the major part of this value. 1 Understanding the relationship between spot and futures prices is thus of crucial importance for all participants in the carbon market. Naturally, this relationship depends on the underlying market characteristics. Greenhouse gas emission rights, called EU allowances (EUAs), allow for the emission of one ton of CO 2 each. At present, the EU ETS comprises two trading periods, the trial period from 2005 -2007 and the so-called Kyoto commitment period from 2008 -2012 . A proposal for the third trading period from 2013 onwards is currently discussed. Within these trading periods, not only regulated CO 2 emitters but any investor may trade EUAs without restriction. As storage of EUAs is possible and virtually costless within trading periods, a long forward position can easily be replicated by buying EUAs on credit. If, on the other hand, there is no direct benefit of possessing EUAs until needed for compliance, regulated CO 2 emitters could sell some of their EUAs and use a money market account to replicate a short forward position. In this case, the relationship between spot and forward prices should be described entirely by the cost-of-carry approach.
Although there is some recent research examining the price dynamics of EUAs, 2 only very few papers analyze how EUA spot and futures prices are related. Daskalakis/ Psychoyios/Markellos (2009) use a jump-diffusion spot price model and a mean reversion stochastic convenience yield to describe the relationship between spot and futures markets for contracts written within the trial period that expire in the Kyoto commitment period. 3 In contrast to this work, our main focus is on futures contracts that are written and maturing in the same period. 4 We thoroughly analyze the relationship between spot and first period futures contracts in order to provide empirical evidence for or against the costof-carry relation. Moreover, we argue that due to the market design there is no clear 1 See Capoor/Ambrosi (2008) . 2 See Benz/Trück (2008) , Fehr/Hinz (2006) , Paolella/Taschini (2008) , or Seifert/Uhrig-Homburg/Wagner (2008) . 3 See also Borak et al. (2006) who analyze convenience yields for futures prices with maturities up to 2012. 4 To verify that the standard cost-of-carry relationship holds for first period futures, Daskalakis/ Psychoyios/Markellos (2009) simply calculate mean squared deviations between theoretical and actual futures prices and argue that these confirm our findings for first period futures contracts.
connection between spot and second period futures prices because futures for the second trading period are written on an underlying that is not actually being traded in the first period. EUAs for the trial period cannot be used for compliance in the Kyoto commitment period. Therefore, at least from an economic perspective, it is not very instructive to define a convenience yield in a backwards manner, such that the usual no-arbitrage pricing relationship holds. One should simply state that in this case, we are not able to learn much about fair futures prices from the current spot market.
In the following Section 2, we introduce the institutional details that are relevant for our analysis. Section 3 discusses the relationship between spot and futures prices taking into account the underlying market characteristics. Within a trading period, we expect the cost-of-carry approach to be valid, whereas no clear relationship is expected to exist between spot and futures contracts maturing in the next trading period due to strict banking and borrowing constraints. Section 4 performs empirical tests based on the cointegration methodology and analyzes whether spot or futures prices lead the price discovery process. First, we test whether spot and futures prices follow the cost-of-carry approach in the long-term. Before December 2005, there existed apparent arbitrage possibilities in the immature market. Thereafter, a fairly stable cointegrating relationship emerged between spot and futures prices in accordance with the cost-of-carry approach.
We thus also continue to analyze the short-term dynamics within a suitable vector error correction model (VECM). Due to the immaturity of the EU ETS, deviations from the equilibrium relationship may have existed for some time. However, our estimates indicate that the equilibrium is restored within only a few days. The VECM also allows to study whether the futures market serves as a price discovery vehicle for the spot prices, giving an indication of which market processes information more efficiently. Section 5 concludes. have two possibilities to solve the problem. They may either abate some of their emissions or buy the EUAs they lack on the market. The intended effect is that companies with cheap abatement opportunities will abate more CO 2 and sell the EUAs in the market to companies for which abatement is more costly. If companies fail to comply, they have to pay a penalty and must also deliver the missing EUAs in the following year. EUAs are freely tradable across all EU member states, meaning that companies may also buy EUAs from companies in other countries.
However, there is a major restriction, commonly referred to as the trading period break.
EUAs that are issued in the first trading period (2005 -2007) 
Spot versus Futures Prices

SPOT PRICES, FUTURES PRICES, AND MARKET CHARACTERISTICS
The relationship between spot and futures prices depends on the underlying market characteristics. As Ross (1997) ) ( − = with S t denoting the spot price at time t while TF t (T) stands for the futures price of a contract with delivery in T. However, in many commodity markets, a significant part of the demand is driven by real needs. As a consequence, holding the physical commodity not only imposes costs but may also result in an additional benefit for the holder.
According to Brennan (1991) , this benefit, which accrues to the owner of the spot commodity as opposed to the owner of a futures contract, is defined as a convenience yield. Such benefits may arise through the opportunity to circumvent shortages in the spot 7 Companies may also use CERs and ERUs generated from CDM and JI projects for compliance instead of EUAs. CERs are bankable from the first to the second trading period, but there is a strict percentage limit for their usage in the EU ETS.
commodity when needed for a production process. Typical examples are fuels like gas, 
=
Here c describes the constant convenience yield net of physical storage costs. It is sometimes argued that the convenience yield shows a correlation to some exogenously given variables. An example for such a correlated variable is the total stock of inventory for the corresponding commodity. In this case, the convenience yield itself may be stochastic and will weaken the link between spot and futures prices.
Finally, at the other end of the market spectrum, there exist pure consumption goods, which are either virtually unstorable or are storable only at prohibitive costs, such as power or wheat. In this situation, there is no longer a clear connection between spot prices and futures prices. A definition of a convenience yield in a backwards manner, such that the usual no-arbitrage pricing relationship holds, might be useful from a modeling perspective. However, the economic meaning would no longer correspond to Brennan's definition of the flow of services that accrues to the investor from holding an inventory.
In this case, we are not able to learn much about fair futures prices from the current spot market. It is thus necessary to build expectations vis-à-vis the future spot prices in order to price futures contracts.
As explained above, EUAs are tradable without restrictions within trading periods, and the only significant storage costs are the foregone interests. The only plausible reason for discounted futures prices to differ from spot prices in the absence of stochastic interest rates is thus a potential convenience yield of the spot EUA. In general, forward and futures prices differ due to marking-to-market and implied options. Since the futures on EUAs do not include valuable options, such as those regarding the quality of the underlying to be delivered, only the valuation differences due to marking-to-market effects stemming from correlations between the EUA spot prices and the risk-free interest rates remain. However, the evidence for such a correlation is weak. 8 Thus, for the purpose of this study, we neglect the difference and treat forwards and futures equivalently. The relationship between spot and futures prices within a trading period should thus be explained entirely by the cost-of-carry approach as described in equation (3.1).
From the point of view of the trial period, futures maturing in the second trading period constitute a different situation. The first period spot certificate may not be transferred to the second trading period. For a future 2008, for example, the situation is thus comparable to the situation described above for power and wheat. The cash-and-carry arbitrage is not possible and the current (first period) spot certificate is of no use for the second trading period. Moreover, the expected spot price for the year 2008 is influenced by factors that do not have any impact on first period's spot prices, such as the final decision of the EU vis-à-vis EUA allocations for the second trading period. As a consequence, we do not expect the cost-of-carry or constant convenience yield approach to hold in this situation. Equation (3.1) allows us to calculate theoretical futures prices from spot prices and interest rates and compare them to observed futures prices. Comparing observed and theoretical futures prices has the advantage of ensuring that the theoretical cointegration relationship remains constant over time. Accordingly, we define the difference between observed and theoretical futures prices as equilibrium error ν t ,
The analysis of these price differences tells us whether our pricing assumption (3.1) for futures contracts is valid. However, it does not explicitly test whether a convenience yield exists. For this, we calculate implied yields by
, where y t (T) describes the yield between times t and T implied from spot and observed
futures prices F t (T).
According to equation (3.1), this implied yield should equal the riskfree interest rate for the relevant time period. Thus, we define the difference between implied yields and riskless interest rates as equilibrium error ω t ,
Any difference of y t (T) and r can be attributed to a possible convenience yield.
DATA DESCRIPTION
Both spot EUAs and futures contracts are traded on several exchanges across Europe. We choose to work with spot prices from the Powernext exchange 9 and futures prices from the European Climate Exchange (ECX) for two reasons. First, volume data from Bloomberg showed that the Powernext was the most liquid EUA spot exchange, while the ECX was the most liquid futures exchange for EUAs in the trial period. Second, in June 2005, the Powernext and the ECX announced plans to merge their operations in order to 9 Competition for market share of the global carbon market induced several announcements about alliances between exchanges and the launch of new exchanges. Powernext® Carbon, the leading spot EUA to analyze the pricing relationships and shows some descriptive statistics. In addition, Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the corresponding equilibrium errors ν t and ω t .
[Insert Table 1 is striking that at the beginning of the sample period, the implied yield was obviously below the riskless interest rate. Notice from One possibly distorting effect vis-à-vis the cost-of-carry relationship between spot and futures when the end date of an EUA futures contract at the ECX is approached could be 10 Another reason might be that some regulated companies did not allow their traders to exploit these arbitrage opportunities merely for political reasons. Note that the bulk of EUAs was granted for free to regulated companies. 
Testing the No-Arbitrage Relationship
Our analysis of the cost-of-carry relationship and price discovery in the EU ETS draws heavily from the cointegration methodology. According to economic theory, discounted futures prices should equal spot prices in equilibrium and implied yields from spot and futures prices should equal riskless interest rates within the first trading period. Even if one concedes that there may be temporary disequilibria due to the immaturity of the market, in the long-term, discounted futures prices and spot prices should be cointegrated.
The same is true for implied yields and interest rates. Due to our focus on bivariate systems where there is at most one single cointegration vector, we present results of the two-step estimation procedure of Engle/Granger (1987) . However, results are robust with respect to alternative tests for cointegration such as the system-based techniques developed by Johansen 12 with key benefits in a more general multivariate context. The cointegration methodology is widely used in the financial and commodity markets literature. 13
11 An analysis of first period spot and future contracts beyond that date is not very instructive, however, because EUA prices quickly moved towards zero at that time and stayed there until the end of the period.
LONG-TERM DYNAMICS OF EQUILIBRIUM RELATIONSHIP
In a first step, we test whether the time series under scrutiny are cointegrated. To this end, we can
• either pre-specify the cointegration vector according to economic theory
• or explicitly estimate the cointegration relation.
Both alternatives are presented in the following. Univariate unit root tests (augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP)) on the levels and first differences indicate that all time series tested are integrated of order one. Results are available upon request.
Pre-specified cointegration vector
To verify cointegration with a cointegration vector specified from theoretical considerations we test whether the equilibrium errors ν t and ω t are I(1). [Insert Table 3 about here]
Results for the whole sample period (the upper half of 
Estimation of the cointegration relation
As an alternative to pre-specifying the cointegration vector, we can estimate the cointegration relation by ordinary least squares and then test whether the residuals from this regression are I(1). For example for the combination F06/TF06 we run a regression TF t 06 = β F06 t + u t to obtain the cointegration vector (1, -β). Given that we can reject the null hypothesis that the residuals are I(1), the regression parameter is estimated superconsistently (see Stock (1987) 
SHORT-TERM DYNAMICS OF EQUILIBRIUM ERROR
Given the established cointegration relationship we can now analyze how prices respond to deviations from the long-run equilibrium relation. To this end, we refer to Engle/Granger (1987, p. 255f) , who assert that a valid representation for two cointegrated variables TF t and F t is a vector error correction model. Let 15 To further support our assumptions of cointegrated time series we also conduct Trace tests within a VAR setup for the various combinations. See Johansen (1991) and Osterwald-Lenum (1992) . Due to some outliers in the residuals the normality assumption is often not guaranteed so that these cointegration tests might be biased or misleading. Normality is presumed because for the Trace test Maximum Likelihood principles apply. Despite the fact that normality often failed, Trace tests lead basically to the same conclusions as the previous ADF tests with regard to the existence of a cointegration relation. .
Because we already have specified the cointegrating vector, applying simple ordinary least squares estimations of each equation leads to consistent and efficient parameter estimates. Table 5 presents the estimation results of (4.2) for the combinations F06/TF06, F07/TF07, and Y06/I06 for the shortened sample period after December 2005. Moreover, results of a Wald test are given to check whether we can accept to restrict the cointegration vector to (1, -1) as the cost-of-carry hypothesis suggests.
First, Table 5 shows that for the combinations F06/TF06 and F07/TF07 we can indeed accept the cost-of-carry hypothesis with a high probability. Next, our interest is whether the disequilibrium is restored quickly or whether it persists over several days. Looking at equation (4.2), we notice that in order to have the equilibrium relation 0 = − F TF β restored in only one time step, the estimated coefficients must satisfy1 .
We call the right-hand side of this equation the "speed of adjustment" and also report the corresponding values in the Table 5 . A value of 1 means that the equilibrium relation is restored in one day, lower values mean that it takes longer, and a value of 0 means that the equilibrium is not restored at all. The estimated values of 0.78 and 0.71 show that the ) ( F TF βδ δ − − = spot and futures prices under scrutiny actually revert back rather quickly. Interestingly, the coefficients capturing the transitional dynamics to the equilibrium relationship reveal that a convergence is not reached while both series adjust towards the equilibrium.
Rather, the negative sign of means that the future price reaction leads to further equilibrium divergence but the spot price reaction reduces the divergence with a price reaction being much higher than the future price reaction. shows that the implied yield from spot and future prices strongly responds to a deviation from the long-run equilibrium while, not surprisingly, the riskless interest rate does not adjust at all. Interestingly, the speed of adjustment measure of 0.92 shows that the equilibrium is restored very quickly.
Y δ
PRICE DISCOVERY IN THE EU ETS
Finally, it is important to know how pricing-relevant information is processed in the market. Will new information show up in spot or futures markets first? In other words, which market is the center of price discovery 17 on exchanges? Volume data from Bloomberg shows that EUA futures trading is far more liquid than spot trading even for the most liquid futures contract under scrutiny. This is common in many commodity markets. A first guess would thus be in favor of the futures contract. Based on the estimated VECM, a variety of measures can be applied in order to assess the price leadership (see De Jong (2002) and Baillie et al. (2002) ). Table 6 shows statistics that help to assess the contribution of spot and futures prices to price discovery.
16 Heaney (1998) reports similar results for the London Metal Exchange Lead contract. 17 Spot and futures prices are usually tested in mature markets with very high data frequency. For example, Theissen (2005) uses data with a frequency of 15 seconds. For the as yet immature EU ETS, only daily data are available to us. However, in thinly traded markets, differences in price discovery between spot and futures contracts may also be observed on a daily data basis, as shown, for example, by Kavussanos/Nomikos (2003) for the freight futures market.
Based on the coefficients in the VECM we can calculate the common factor weight (CFW), a direct measure of the contribution to price discovery. See Gonzalo/Granger (1995) and Theissen (2002) for a formal justification of this measure.
The contribution of the futures market to price discovery is obtained by
The adjustment coefficients δ TF and δ F from equation (4.2a/b) determine the permanent effect of a shock of the respective market on the system. In the definition given above, a CFW of 1 means that this market contributes exclusively to price discovery. A CFW of 0.5 means that both markets contribute equally to price discovery. Looking at . In both cases, the futures market reacts least to price movements in the other market indicating that futures prices are the main contributors to price discovery.
Another popular measure proposed by Hasbrouck (1995) assumes that price volatility reflects new information and considers each market's contribution to the variance of the innovations to the common factor. When the error terms are correlated Hasbrouck's information shares (IS) are not unique, but Baillie et al. (2002, p.320.) argue that the average of Hasbrouck's upper and lower bounds provides a sensible estimate of price discovery. The two bounds of Hasbrouck's IS measuring the contribution of the futures markets are obtained by Table 6 reports the averages of these values for the combinations F06/TF06 and F07/TF07. Again, the values of 0.67 and 0.68 are above 0.5 and thus indicate that the futures market contributes most to price discovery.
, ,
Finally, we also perform Granger causality tests on the theoretical and observed future for the combinations F06/TF06 and F07/TF07. 18 While the null hypothesis "Observed future does not Granger-cause the theoretical future" is clearly rejected for both combinations at the 1% significance level, the contrary null hypothesis "Theoretical future does not Granger-cause the observed future" is only rejected at the 5% significance level. Although we find bidirectional Granger causality the clearer effect comes from the futures market.
All three measures indicate that the futures market leads the price discovery process. This is consistent with results known from many financial and commodity markets. 19 One reason may be the higher liquidity in the futures market. As opposed to spot contracts, transactions with EUA futures do not have to be accounted for in the emissions registers before maturity. Moreover, companies without their own EUA allocations can only achieve short positions in the futures and not in the spot market. Companies seeking reliable price signals in the EU ETS should therefore always start by looking at the futures market.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between spot and futures markets for CO 2 emission allowances in the EU ETS. Our hypothesis was that within a trading period, spot and futures prices can be described by the cost-of-carry approach. An important implication from our findings for energy producers and other market participants in the EU ETS is that EUA futures maturing within a trading period are suitable instruments for hedging CO 2 -related risks. This is due to their strong and clear 18 See Granger (1969) . 19 See e.g. Chan (1992) , Booth/So/Tse (1999) , Kavussanos/Nomikos (2003) , Theissen (2005) , or Gonzalo/ Figuerola-Ferretti (2009). linkage to EUA spot prices. For example, power producers selling power futures may at the same time hedge their need for EUAs in the EUA futures market.
In contrast, we argue that it is not very instructive to link spot and second period futures prices via some convenience yield approach. The simple reason is that due to the strict banking and borrowing restriction second period futures are written on a completely different underlying that is not actually being traded in the first period. Therefore, a convenience yield calculated in a backwards manner from first period spot and second period futures prices, such that the usual no-arbitrage pricing relationship holds does not reflect the real benefit, which accrues to the owner of the spot commodity as opposed to the owner of a futures contract. (12) *, **, and *** stand for rejection at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels. For the ADF and PP tests, the null hypothesis is the existence of a unit root; for the KPSS test, the null hypothesis is a stationary series. All unit root and stationarity tests assume an intercept and no linear trend. For the ADF test, the estimated intercept is also shown. 0.202157 *, **, and *** stand for rejection at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels. For the ADF tests, the null hypothesis is the existence of a unit root. All unit root tests assume an intercept and no linear trend. Critical values have been calculated according to MacKinnon (1991) . Note, that the results remain qualitatively unchanged if the dependent and independent variables in equation (*) are replaced by each other. These results are not tabulated to save space and can be obtained from the authors on request. 
